Shipping Lines and Maritime Economics in South America

When Hapag-Lloyd announced on February 16, 2026, that it had signed a merger agreement to acquire Israel’s ZIM in a deal valued at about USD 4.2 billion, the message for shippers was not simply “another M&A headline.” It was a reminder that, in container shipping, market competitiveness is often built through network control: who has the scale to defend weekly coverage, redeploy capacity fast when demand shifts, and negotiate better terms with terminals and suppliers. Hapag-Lloyd said the combined business would exceed 3 million TEU of capacity and operate more than 400 vessels, explicitly framing the deal as a way to “significantly” strengthen its network.

Reuters also reported that analysts expected the transaction to lift Hapag-Lloyd’s global market share from roughly 7% to nearly 9%, allowing growth without a slower, capital-intensive fleet expansion path.

Maritime logistics, though, is not only container shipping. South America’s seaborne economy runs on two parallel systems: containerized liner networks moving manufactured goods and higher-value cargo, and bulk shipping moving the region’s heavyweights, from iron ore and grains to energy and industrial commodities.

Brazil is disproportionately relevant in bulk, ranking as the world’s second-largest exporter of iron ore, a reminder that the country’s maritime footprint cannot be read only through TEUs. UNCTAD routinely uses Brazil’s long-haul iron ore flows as a reference point for the economics of bulk trades and distance-driven transport costs. This article makes that distinction explicit because it shapes the interpretation of the data: the focus here is container shipping lines, maritime trade routes, and TEU-based connectivity using Datamar’s DataLiner dataset, leaving bulk shipping as the natural subject for a dedicated follow-up.

In South America, maritime transport is not a marginal channel but the backbone of trade connectivity. UNCTAD notes that over 80% of world trade volume is carried by sea, which means shipping lines effectively operate the plumbing of globalization. For South American exporters and importers, the practical impact is felt through maritime trade routes: which ports get direct calls, where transshipment becomes necessary, how often sailings run, and what maritime freight costs do when capacity tightens or ports congest.

South American ports and carrier concentration: what Datamar DataLiner shows in January 2026

The clearest way to keep the discussion grounded is to start where the market is measurable: Datamar’s DataLiner data. In January 2026, the Southern Cone’s container throughput shows how strongly regional trade lanes concentrate around a few gateways. Santos handled 223,125 TEUs year-to-date (exports plus imports) and held 33% market share among the ranked ports, even after a 9.4% year-on-year decline. Buenos Aires followed with 93,346 TEUs and 14% share, then Paranaguá with 76,278 TEUs and 11%.

This data reveals more than just a port ranking; it is a map of how South American ports concentrate service intensity, equipment availability, and network optionality.

Table 1 - Container Throughput Port Ranking | Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Argentina | Jan. 2026 | Exports and Imports | TEUs

Source: DataLiner (click here to request a demo)

That concentration is not unique to the Southern Cone. ECLAC’s Port Profile of Latin America and the Caribbean tracks throughput and rankings across the region, underscoring how a relatively small set of hubs concentrate containerized flows and act as the entry points to global liner networks. Once a port becomes a dominant node, shipping lines reinforce the advantage by putting more strings through it, which further increases its pull on inland logistics and trade corridors. When the dominant node is stressed, the reverse happens: liner networks adjust, calling patterns change, and the cost of doing trade rises.

Datamar’s carrier-by-port figures show exactly how shipping lines “make” this network reality. In Santos, Maersk handled 66,462 TEUs in January, up 10% year-on-year, with 29.79% market share, while MSC handled 47,058 TEUs, down 15%, with 21.09% share, and CMA CGM handled 32,400 TEUs, up 3.8%, with 14.52% share.

Buenos Aires illustrates the same mechanism from another angle. Maersk handled 17,765 TEUs there, down 11%, MSC handled 16,361 TEUs, down 11%, but Hapag-Lloyd handled 13,023 TEUs and grew 41.9% to reach 16.24% share. Paranaguá shows how a port’s profile can become tightly linked to a carrier’s footprint: Maersk handled 25,039 TEUs there, up 14.9%, with 32.83% share, while MSC moved 15,811 TEUs with 20.73% share, and Hapag-Lloyd handled 10,978 TEUs with 14.39% share after a 16.1% decline.

In practical terms, the Santos tradelane ecosystem is heavily shaped by how these carriers allocate vessels and schedule loops into the port. When one of them shifts capacity, it changes the weekly “supply” of slots and containers available to Brazilian shippers, which is maritime economics and logistics in its most concrete form. Those details matter because port competitiveness is not only about cranes and draft; it is also about whether carriers decide to grow a port’s position inside their networks.

Zooming out to Brazil as a whole, Datamar’s DataLiner dataset highlights how carrier competition and alliance structure shape the country’s maritime trade routes. Maersk and MSC are essentially tied in TEUs handled, with Maersk at 139,107 TEUs and 26.02% share after 11.8% growth, and MSC at 137,410 TEUs and 25.71% share after a 10% decline. CMA CGM follows with 68,739 TEUs and 12.86% share, and Hapag-Lloyd with 63,362 TEUs and 11.85% share. ZIM appears at 8,660 TEUs and 1.62% share, with a -36.3% drop.

Read through the lens of the Hapag-Lloyd–ZIM deal, the implication is not that South America suddenly “changes overnight,” but that consolidation can reinforce the competitive advantage of carriers that already have stronger network depth and equipment control in the region’s main gateways.

Table 2 - Carrier Participation in Brazilian Market | January 2026 | TEUs

Source: DataLiner (click here to request a demo)

Alliance structure reinforces the same point. In Brazil, Datamar’s figures show Gemini (Maersk + Hapag-Lloyd) with 37.8% market share (exports plus imports), independents (including MSC and ZIM, among others) with 30.9%, Ocean Alliance with 19.8%, and The Alliance with 11.3%.

For South American shippers, alliances are not a branding detail; they are a determinant of schedule density and port coverage on key corridors, including Asia–East Coast South America and transatlantic lanes. When alliances redraw services, some ports gain direct connectivity while others become more dependent on feeders and transshipment.

That is why port concentration in Brazil, especially around Santos, is inseparable from the economics of shipping lines and maritime freight. If a dominant hub becomes constrained, carriers protect network efficiency by adjusting rotations, increasing transshipment, or applying congestion-related surcharges. DatamarNews reported that Santos has faced recurring capacity strain for containers, keeping operational pressure high and turning infrastructure constraints into a competitiveness issue for trade lanes.

In parallel, new investments and regulatory debates around Santos expansion reflect the fact that carriers need reliable berth windows and yard capacity to run modern networks efficiently; when a gateway cannot keep up, the region’s trade becomes more costly and less predictable, tightening the link between maritime economics and logistics and national competitiveness.

Trade policy shocks and tradelanes

Policy shocks further underline how tightly tradelanes respond to shipping-line economics. Datamar’s export partner data shows China as Brazil’s top containerized export destination at 40,275 TEUs, up 4%, while the United States is second at 20,885 TEUs but down 34%. In practice, sudden demand contraction on a becomes a carrier decision about how many weekly sailings to keep, which ports to call, and where to redeploy vessels to defend utilization. Those network decisions then feed back into costs and competitiveness for exporters.

Chart 1 - Brazil Top trading partners – Exports | January 2026 | TEUs

Source: DataLiner (click here to request a demo)

The cargo mix in Datamar’s dataset also keeps the story anchored. To China, Brazil’s leading exports in January 2026 included frozen bovine meat (7,780 TEUs, up 4.8%), cotton (7,043 TEUs, up 79.5%), and chemical wood pulp (6,954 TEUs, up 47%). These flows reinforce South America’s role as a major exporter of farming goods and resource-linked products, even in container trade.

Chart 2 - Brazil Top Trading Partners – Imports | January 2026 | TEUs

Source: DataLiner (click here to request a demo)

On the import side, China also dominates at 157,218 TEUs and 52% share, while the United States accounts for 20,047 TEUs and 7% share. The most imported items from China include autoparts (19,971 TEUs), polymers of ethylene (14,636 TEUs), and tyres (12,280 TEUs).

This pattern supports the broader competitiveness narrative: South America’s exporters often depend on low-cost, reliable maritime transport to move large volumes of commodity-linked cargo, while its industrial base relies on steady imports of higher value-added inputs. When shipping lines tighten capacity, when ports choke, or when policies disrupt demand, the pressure shows up in both directions of trade.

Maritime trade routes on the Pacific side: why Chancay could shift regional port hierarchies

Infrastructure competition in the region adds another layer to the same shipping-line logic. Regional port data makes clear that connectivity and throughput are distributed unevenly; new hubs can shift flows if they attract direct calls and improve reliability.

Peru’s recently built Port of Chancay is relevant to shipping lines because it is being built as a deep-water hub meant to attract direct Asia services and reduce reliance on transshipment. Reuters has reported that the COSCO-led project involves about USD 1.4 billion in investment and was inaugurated during the 2024 APEC summit by the presidents of Peru and China. That matters operationally because hub viability is decided by the ability to sustain frequent calls with larger vessels. Reuters also reported that China’s Guangzhou Port launched a direct route to Chancay, with state media citing expectations of cutting logistics costs by 20%.

Even if that percentage varies by cargo and contract, the direction is clear: fewer handling steps and more direct connectivity can improve the economics of maritime transport to south America’s Pacific side. For regional competitiveness, the implication is straightforward. If Chancay consistently wins direct calls, it can re-balance maritime trade routes along the Pacific coast, reshaping which South American ports act as hubs versus feeders, and shifting how shipping lines price and schedule services into and out of the continent.

Maritime economics: what the data says about competitiveness in South America

The central conclusion stays the same, and Datamar’s numbers make it hard to miss. Shipping lines are not simply responding to South America’s trade; they are one of the mechanisms that determines how trade flows, how regional connectivity is organized, and how competitive the region can be on the world market. Datamar’s DataLiner data shows where volume is concentrated, which carriers dominate which gateways, and how alliances structure capacity. When over 80% of global trade volume moves by sea, the economics of shipping lines and ports becomes a core component of maritime economics, not a background detail.

Learn more about the data source and analytical tools that support this type of market intelligence at DataLiner by Datamar:  https://www.datamar.com/en/products/dataliner